

Differential Privacy Algorithms for Decentralised Multi-Agent RL

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Google Fi suffers data breach, customer info compromised

According to TechCrunch, Google Fi's primary network provider informed the company that suspicious activity had been detected regarding a third-party support system containing a "limited amount" of customer data.

IANS • February 01, 2023, 12:25 IST



Figure: Source: Economic Times

Importance of data privacy

- **Protection** of personal information, financial records, and health information, etc.
- **Threat** to organizations such as financial losses, and reputational damage, etc.

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Challenges in data privacy

- More sophisticated cyberattacks
- Widespread collection and storage of personal information
- Lack of security measures, encryption protocols to safeguard sensitive information

Traditional approaches

- **Suppression**: removing names, addresses, or any other personal information
- **Aggregation**: provide summary statistics while obscuring individual-level details
- **Perturbation**: adding noise or random variation to the data

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Limitations of traditional approaches


- **Re-identification attacks** – use of auxiliary information or other datasets
- Privacy and data utility **trade-off**
- **Aggressive anonymization** – loss of data utility

Motivation for differential privacy

- Protecting sensitive information in datasets.
- Preventing re-identification of individuals through data analysis.
- Fostering trust between data collectors and individuals.
- Complying with privacy regulations and standards (e.g., Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, of India and General Data Protection Regulation (GRDP))

Local differential privacy (LDP)

- Introduced by Dwork et.al. 2006¹



- Single data point does not change the output

¹Dwork, Cynthia, and Aaron Roth. "The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy." Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science 9.3-4 (2014): 211-407.

Privacy loss

$$c(o; \mathcal{M}, \mathbf{aux}, d, d') := \left| \log \frac{\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{aux}, d) = o)}{\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{aux}, d') = o)} \right|$$

- Here \mathcal{M} is the randomized mechanism
- \mathbf{aux} is auxiliary input
- d, d' are neighbouring data points
- o is the outcome

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Local differential privacy (Liao et.al. 2022)

A randomized mechanism \mathcal{M} preserves (ϵ, δ) -LDP if

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(D_u) \in U) \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(D_{u'}) \in U) + \delta, U \in \mathcal{U} \quad (1)$$

- $\epsilon \geq 0$, and $\delta \geq 0$ are user given privacy parameters
- $D_u, D_{u'} \in \mathcal{U}$ are the datasets, differing in exactly one component, corresponding to the users u and u'

LDP (outline)

- Consider a task for which mean height, μ , is a crucial input
- Let D be a dataset of a cohort
- Height values of D need to be protected
- *Anonymise* them.
- One way is to '*add noise*'; say, $U[-1, 1]$ (uniform rv, over $[-1, 1]$ interval) to the observed heights

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-
- $\mu = \mu_D + \delta_\mu$
 - μ_D is sample mean of heights
 - δ_μ is the sample mean of $U[-1, 1]$, is small, *but* not zero
 - Consequences?
 - Quantify the above error in the estimate?
 - May be via concentration inequalities, etc.
 - $\mathbb{P}(|\delta_\mu| \leq \epsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$ for ϵ and δ ?

Multi-agent instance

$$(N, \mathcal{S}, \{\mathcal{A}^i\}_{i \in N}, H, \{r_h^i\}_{i \in N, h \in H}, \{\mathbb{P}_h\}_{h \in H}, \{\mathcal{G}_t\}_{t \geq 0})$$

- State is global information
- Each agent takes independent action
- However, they have a common objective
- Action is a private information; hence, reward is private
- Fixed finite horizon model, total reward criteria

Global state value function

$$V_h^\pi(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[\sum_{h'=h}^H \bar{r}_{h'}(\mathbf{s}_{h'}, \pi_{h'}(\mathbf{s}'_h)) \right]$$

- Here $\bar{r}_{h'}(\mathbf{s}_{h'}, \pi_{h'}(\mathbf{s}'_h)) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in N} r_{h'}^i(\mathbf{s}_{h'}, \pi_{h'}(\mathbf{s}'_h))$

- \mathcal{G}_t is time varying communication network used to exchange the reward parameters \mathbf{w} in a decentralized framework
- Particularly, the reward parameters are exchanged via \mathcal{G}_t
- Thus, our MARL framework is fully decentralized

Global state-action value function

$$Q_h^\pi(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) = \mathbb{E}_\pi \left[\bar{r}_h(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) + \sum_{h'=h+1}^H \bar{r}_{h'}(\mathbf{s}_{h'}, \pi_{h'}(\mathbf{s}_{h'})) \right]$$

Multi-agent local differential privacy

A randomized mechanism \mathcal{M} preserves (ϵ, δ) MA-LDP if

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{D}_u) \in U) \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}(\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{D}_{u'}) \in U) + \delta, U \in \mathcal{U}. \quad (2)$$

- $\epsilon \geq 0$, and $\delta \geq 0$ are user given privacy parameters
- Here $\mathbf{D}_u = (D_u^1, D_u^2, \dots, D_u^n) \in \mathcal{U}$ and $\mathbf{D}_{u'} = (D_{u'}^1, D_{u'}^2, \dots, D_{u'}^n) \in \mathcal{U}$
- D_u^i and $D_{u'}^i$ differs at **exactly one** component
- User $u \in K$ is **different** from agent $i \in N$

Objective 1

Design a **decentralized** MA-LDP algorithm such that following regret over K episodes is minimized

$$R_K = \sum_{k=1}^K \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in N} \{V_1^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}_1^k) - V_1^i(\mathbf{s}_1^k)\} \right) \quad (3)$$

$V_1^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}_1^k)$ is a global value function in the eyes of agent i with **full** privacy (no privacy loss with full confidence)

We design a decentralized MA-LDP algorithm with sub-linear regret !

Noise adding mechanisms

- MA-LDP algorithm can handle **any** noise adding mechanisms
- We use **Gaussian, Laplace, Uniform, and Bounded Laplace**
- Gaussian and Laplace – unbounded supports

Noise adding mechanisms

- MA-LDP algorithm can handle **any** noise adding mechanisms
- We use **Gaussian, Laplace, Uniform, and Bounded Laplace**
- Gaussian and Laplace – unbounded supports
- Unbounded support noise mechanisms inject high noise to the sensitive information, though with low probability
- Loss of data utility – motivates the bounded noise mechanisms
- Uniform and bounded Laplace mechanisms
- Bounded support of noise models capture finite precision arithmetic of computers

Objective 2

How does privacy and regret change with the noise distribution support?

- Bounded mechanisms preserve the MA-LDP privacy
- We show that our MA-LDP algorithm has sub-linear regret.
- Regret depends on the end points and the parameters of the noise distribution support!

Function approximations

- To address large state and action spaces

Linearity assumption

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{s}'|\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) = \langle \phi(\mathbf{s}'|\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}), \boldsymbol{\theta}^* \rangle \text{ for any triplet } (\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s}) \in \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{S}$$

Notation

$$\mathbb{P}V(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) = \sum_{\mathbf{s}' \in \mathcal{S}} \langle \phi(\mathbf{s}'|\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}), \boldsymbol{\theta}^* \rangle V(\mathbf{s}') = \langle \phi_V(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}), \boldsymbol{\theta}^* \rangle, \quad \forall \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}$$

- Ridge regression to get optimal model parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta}^*$

Linearity of reward functions

$$\bar{r}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}^*) = \langle \psi(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}), \mathbf{w}^* \rangle, \quad \forall \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}$$

- The reward parameterization preserves the privacy of rewards (not the LDP objective!)

Equivalence of optimization problems

- The least square minimizer of the reward function

$$\min_{\mathbf{w}} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}} [\bar{r}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) - \bar{r}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w})]^2. \quad (\text{OP 1})$$

- The above optimization problem is **equivalently characterized** as

$$\min_{\mathbf{w}} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}} [r^i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) - \bar{r}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w})]^2. \quad (\text{OP 2})$$

- OP1, and OP2 has same stationary points
- A key aspect of the **decentralized** algorithm

Reward parameters update

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\mathbf{w}}_t^i &\leftarrow \mathbf{w}_t^i + \gamma_t \cdot [r_t^i(\cdot, \cdot) - \bar{r}(\cdot, \cdot; \mathbf{w}_t^i)] \cdot \nabla_{\mathbf{w}} \bar{r}(\cdot, \cdot; \mathbf{w}_t^i) \\ \mathbf{w}_{t+1}^i &= \sum_{j \in N} l_t(i, j) \tilde{\mathbf{w}}_t^j \end{aligned}$$

- $l_t(i, j)$ is the (i, j) -th entry of communication graph/matrix
- **Result:** $\mathbf{w}_t^i \rightarrow \mathbf{w}^*$ almost surely for every agent $i \in N$

Some comments

- Our MA-LDP is decentralized algorithm ²:
- Each agent is independently taking the action
- Agents' reward is a private information, and hence not known to other agents
- The reward function is parameterized and the parameters are shared across the agents
- This doesn't effect the reward and action privacy
- The sensitive information is preserved by injecting the noise

²Kaitang Zhang et. al. Fully decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning with networked agents. ICML 2018.

Modified Bellman equation

- Let $V^i(\cdot)$ and $Q^i(\cdot, \cdot)$ be the estimate of global $V(\cdot)$ and $Q(\cdot, \cdot)$ by agent i

Modified Bellman equation

$$Q_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i) = \bar{r}_h(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i) + \mathbb{P}_h V_{h+1}^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i);$$
$$V_{h+1}^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i) = \max_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}} Q_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i); \quad V_{H+1}^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i) = 0$$

- $Q_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i)$, $\bar{r}_h(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i)$ and $V_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i)$ are continuous functions of $\mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i$

Result

$$Q_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i) \rightarrow Q_h^*(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) \text{ and } V_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}; \mathbf{w}_{k,h}^i) \rightarrow V_h^*(\mathbf{s}), \text{ for all } i \in N$$

MA-LDP algorithm design

- MA-LDP works in episodes
- Each user/episode receives the information from server
- The server updates the model parameters using the anonymized information

$$\hat{\theta}_{k+1,h}^i \leftarrow (\Sigma_{k+1,h}^i)^{-1} u_{k+1,h}^i \quad (4)$$

- Here Σ^i and u^i are anonymized sensitive information
- Server sends model parameters $\hat{\theta}^i$ to next user

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- Here Σ^i and u^i are anonymized sensitive information
- Server sends model parameters $\hat{\theta}^i$ to next user
- User, on the other hand, updates $Q_{k,h}^i$ according to the backward induction algorithm
- Each agent thus take action

$$\mathbf{a}_{k,h}^i \leftarrow \arg \max_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}^i} \min_{\mathbf{a}^{-i} \in \mathcal{A}^{-i}} Q_{k,h}^i(\mathbf{s}_{k,h}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}^{-i})$$

- The reward function parameters are shared via communication network to preserve the privacy of rewards

- The anonymized information is send to the server
- This server is different from the centralized server used in centralized MARL
- Server performs the following updates

- $\Lambda_{k+1,h}^i \leftarrow \Lambda_{k,h}^i + \Delta\Lambda_{k,h}^i$
- $\mathbf{u}_{k+1,h}^i \leftarrow \mathbf{u}_{k,h}^i + \Delta\mathbf{u}_{k,h}^i$
- $\Sigma_{k+1,h}^i \leftarrow \Lambda_{k+1,h}^i + \eta\mathbf{I}$
- $\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{k+1,h}^i \leftarrow (\Sigma_{k+1,h}^i)^{-1}\mathbf{u}_{k+1,h}^i$

- Here,

$$\Delta\Lambda_{k,h}^i \leftarrow \phi_{V_{k,h+1}^i}(\mathbf{s}_{k,h}, \mathbf{a}_{k,h})\phi_{V_{k,h+1}^i}(\mathbf{s}_{k,h}, \mathbf{a}_{k,h})^\top + \mathbf{W}_{k,h}^i$$

$$\Delta\mathbf{u}_{k,h}^i \leftarrow \phi_{V_{k,h+1}^i}(\mathbf{s}_{k,h}, \mathbf{a}_{k,h})V_{k,h+1}^i(s_{k,h+1}) + \boldsymbol{\xi}_{k,h}^i$$

Regret and privacy guarantees

- MA-LDP algorithm preserves LDP for various noise mechanisms
- For Gaussian mechanism MA-LDP is (ϵ, δ) private
- For Laplace it is $(\epsilon, 0)$

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- These preserve $(0, \delta)$, and $(\epsilon, 0)$ privacy respectively
- Thus, these noise mechanisms cover whole spectrum of the privacy guarantees

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- Thus, these noise mechanisms cover whole spectrum of the privacy guarantees

- For each of the noise mechanisms – regret is sub-linear in K
- It is super-linear (not quadratic) in n , i.e., scales well with n
- For bounded Laplace, regret depends on the endpoint of the support and the distribution parameters

Main results

Mechanism	Privacy	Order of Regret
Gaussian	(ϵ, δ)	$\tilde{O}((nd)^{5/4} H^{7/4} T^{3/4} \log(ndT/\alpha) (\log(H/\delta))^{1/4} \sqrt{1/\epsilon})$
Laplace	$(\epsilon, 0)$	$\tilde{O}((nd)^{5/4} H^{7/4} T^{3/4} \log(ndT/\alpha) \sqrt{1/\epsilon})$
Uniform	$(0, \delta)$	$\tilde{O}((nd)^{5/4} H^{7/4} T^{3/4} \log(ndT/\alpha) (\log(H/\delta))^{1/4})$
Bounded Laplace	$(\epsilon, 0)$	$\tilde{O}((nd)^{5/4} \zeta^{1/4} H^{1/4} T^{3/4} \log(ndT/\alpha))$

Table: Privacy guarantees and the order of regret for different noise adding mechanisms. ζ denotes the variance of bounded Laplace distribution.

- ζ is function of end points of the support of bounded Laplace distribution B and ϵ .
- For every noise mechanism, the regret is sub-linear in $T = KH$
- However, it scales super-linearly with the number of agents, n

Comparison of regret for different noise mechanisms

Theorem

If privacy parameters ϵ_1 and ϵ_2 are such that $\epsilon_1 > \epsilon_2$. Then, for both the **Gaussian** and **Laplace** mechanisms we have that

$$R_K(\epsilon_1) < R_K(\epsilon_2).$$

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Theorem

Let $R_K^G(\epsilon), R_K^L(\epsilon)$ be the cumulative regret of the Gaussian and Laplace mechanism respectively with privacy parameters ϵ, δ , and

$$H > 2. \text{ Then, } R_K^G(\epsilon) > R_K^L(\epsilon).$$

Regret of bounded Laplace

- We construct a BL distribution with parameter b and support $[-B, B]$

$$f_{BL}(x; b) = \begin{cases} \frac{\exp(-|x|/b)}{2b(1-\exp(-B/b))}, & \forall x \in [-B, B] \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- The regret is sub-linear in $T = KH$ and super-linear in n
- Regret of BL is either **same** or **on par** with the Laplace when $B = O(b^\gamma)$ for $\gamma \in [0, 1]$
- Regret of BL is **lower** than Laplace if $\gamma > 1$ and $(H^3/\epsilon)^{\gamma/2} < 1$

B	R_K^{BL}
$O(b^\gamma), 0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$	$\tilde{O}((nd)^{5/4} H^{7/4} T^{3/4} \log(ndT/\alpha)) \sqrt{1/\epsilon}$
$O(b^\gamma), \gamma > 1$	$\tilde{O}((nd)^{5/4} H^{7/4} H^{3\gamma/2} T^{3/4} \log(ndT/\alpha)) \sqrt{1/\epsilon^{\gamma+1}}$

Table: Regret bound for BL mechanism. MA-LDP algorithm with BL mechanism offers the same order of regret as that of the Laplace mechanism when $B = O(b^\gamma)$ for $\gamma \in [0, 1]$. Terms in **red** involve γ .

- Privacy analysis
 - Show that privacy loss is bounded by ϵ with high probability δ
 - ϵ, δ depends on the noise mechanism used
- Regret analysis
 - Transition probability estimators are within specified range of true optimal parameters (Lemma 1, next slide)
 - $Q^{*,i}$ is indeed a good optimistic estimator (Lemma 2, next slide)
 - Decomposition of regret and bounding each term
- The regret and privacy comparison across noise adding mechanisms

Lemma 1 (informal statement)

For all $i \in N$, with probability at least $1 - \alpha/2$, we have

$$\|(\Sigma_{k,h}^i)^{1/2}(\hat{\theta}_{k,h}^i - \theta_h^*)\| \leq \beta_k$$

- Here β_k are identified according to the noise mechanism used
- This proves that the optimistic estimators of the probability function are with a specified range of the true optimal parameters

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- This proves that the optimistic estimators of the probability function are with a specified range of the true optimal parameters

Lemma 2 (informal statement)

For all $i \in N$, we have $Q_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a}) \leq Q_{k,h}^i(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a})$ and $V_h^{*,i}(\mathbf{s}) \leq V_{k,h}^i(\mathbf{s})$

- The above lemma shows that the $Q^{*,i}$ is a good optimistic estimator

Experiments

- The network consists of $\{s_{in}, 1, 2, \dots, q, g\}$ nodes
- Actions $\mathcal{A}^i = \{-1, 1\}^{d-1}$, $d \geq 2$
- **Objective:** to reach the goal node while maximizing the overall reward
- Reward of 5/1000 for any action in s_{in}
- Reward of 1000 for any action in g
- Reward of 0 for any action in any other node




Figure: The MDP problem instance that we consider

Experiments




Figure: Cumulative regret with number of episodes for the Laplace and Gaussian mechanism with 5% error bands. Codes are available here.

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- Injecting a bounded noise is often sufficient for LDP without substantially affecting the nature of the regret
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- Injecting a bounded noise is often sufficient for LDP without substantially affecting the nature of the regret
- Bounded noise captures the realistic finite machine precision
- **Another observation:** Our regret bound is just (not quadratic) super-linear in the number of agents and feature dimensions
- Scope for using better optimistic estimators of the state-action value functions to improve the bounds
- Studying the bounded support noise mechanism with lower regret bounds with low noise values would be interesting

Thank You!